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Abstract
Karp, Vazirani, and Vazirani (STOC 1990) initiated the study of online bipartite matching,
which has held a central role in online algorithms ever since. Of particular importance are the
Ranking algorithm for integral matching and the Water-filling algorithm for fractional matching.
Most algorithms in the literature can be viewed as adaptations of these two in the corresponding
models. Recently, Huang et al. (STOC 2018, SODA 2019) introduced a more general model
called fully online matching, which considers general graphs and allows all vertices to arrive
online. They also generalized Ranking and Water-filling to fully online matching and gave some
tight analysis: Ranking is Ω ≈ 0.567-competitive on bipartite graphs where the Ω-constant
satisfies ΩeΩ = 1, and Water-filling is 2−√2 ≈ 0.585-competitive on general graphs.
We propose fully online matching algorithms strictly better than Ranking and Water-filling.
For integral matching on bipartite graphs, we build on the online primal dual analysis of Ranking
and Water-filling to design a 0.569-competitive hybrid algorithm called Balanced Ranking. To
our knowledge, it is the first integral algorithm in the online matching literature that successfully
integrates ideas from Water-filling. For fractional matching on general graphs, we give a 0.592-
competitive algorithm called Eager Water-filling, which may match a vertex on its arrival. By
contrast, the original Water-filling algorithm always matches vertices at their deadlines. Our
result for fractional matching further shows a separation between fully online matching and
the general vertex arrival model by Wang and Wong (ICALP 2015), due to an upper bound of
0.5914 in the latter model by Buchbinder, Segev, and Tkach (ESA 2017).
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1 Introduction
Online matching is one of the oldest and most fruitful topic in the online algorithms literature.
It dates back to thirty years ago when Karp et al. [18] proposed the online bipartite matching
problem and the Ranking algorithm. Consider a bipartite graph, where the left-hand-side vertices
are offline, i.e., known upfront to the algorithm, and the right-hand-side vertices are online arriving
one at a time. On the arrival of an online vertex, the algorithm observes its incident edges and must
immediately and irrevocably decide how to match it. The goal is to maximize the cardinality of the
matching. For a real-world example, think of online advertising where the offline and online vertices
correspond to advertisers and impressions respectively. Ranking picks a random permutation of the
offline vertices, and matches each online vertex to the first unmatched neighbor by the permutation.
Karp et al. [18] showed that it is 1− 1e -competitive, and this is the best possible for the problem.
In online advertising, an advertiser can usually be matched to many impressions. This is the
b-matching model of Kalyanasundaram and Pruhs [16] where b is the number of times an offline
vertex can be matched, a.k.a., its capacity. This is also closely related to the fractional relaxation
of online bipartite matching where each online vertex may be matched fractionally to multiple
offline neighbors so long as the total matched amount does not exceed one unit.1 In this case,
the optimal 1 − 1e competitive can be achieved with a deterministic algorithm called Water-filling
(a.k.a. Water-level or Balance). It matches each online vertex continuously to the least matched
offline neighbor.
Ranking and Water-filling are the most fundamental algorithms in online bipartite matching
and its variants. Most algorithms in the online matching literature under worst-case analysis can
be viewed as adaptations of them in the corresponding models.
Fully Online Matching. Let us turn to a different real-world scenario which involves a bipartite
matching problem with an online flavor. Consider a ride-hailing platform that matches drivers on
one side and passengers on the other side. This is not captured by the model of Karp et al. [18]
because vertices on both sides of the bipartite graph arrive and depart online. To this end, Huang
et al. [13, 14] recently introduced a generalized model called fully online matching. Each vertex in
the fully online model is associated with not only an arrival time but also a deadline. Each edge is
revealed to the algorithm when both endpoints have arrived, and can be selected into the matching
anytime before the endpoints’ deadlines provided that they are still unmatched. Furthermore, the
model extends naturally to general graphs, capturing an even broader class of problems including
matching passengers in ride-sharing.
Huang et al. [13, 14] generalized both Ranking and Water-filling to fully online matching. Both
algorithms only match vertices at their deadlines. Ranking selects a random permutation of all
vertices;2 then, for any vertex that stays unmatched till its deadline, Ranking matches it to the
first available neighbor by the permutation. Similarly, for any vertex that is not fully matched by
its deadline, Water-filling matches the remaining portion fractionally to the least-matched available
neighbors. They showed that Ranking is 0.521-competitive on general graphs. For bipartite graphs,
they gave an tight analysis that Ranking is Ω ≈ 0.567-competitive, where the Ω-constant is the
solution of Ω ·eΩ = 1. Further, they proved a tight 2−√2 ≈ 0.585 competitive ratio of Water-filling
on general graphs. Finally, they separated fully online matching with online bipartite matching of
Karp et al. [18] by showing that there is no 1− 1e -competitive algorithm in the fully online model.
1The fractional problem is equivalent to a b-matching problem in which online vertices arrive in batches of b copies
and b tends to infinity. Further, the assumption of having b copies per online vertex is irrelevant in existing analysis.
2For example, draw a random number in [0, 1) on the arrival of each vertex and sort them by the numbers.
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1.1 Our Contributions
This work is driven by a natural question: Are Ranking and Water-filling optimal in fully online
matching, like in many other online matching models? In particular, is the Ω ≈ 0.567 competitive
ratio the best possible for integral algorithms on bipartite graphs? How about the 2−√2 ≈ 0.585
competitive ratio for fractional algorithms on general graphs? Surprisingly, the answers are no!
There are algorithms strictly better than Ranking and Water-filling in fully online matching!
Beating Ranking on Bipartite Graphs. We follow a simple intuition: since Water-filling has
a superior competitive ratio, we may “correct” the decisions by Ranking with those by Water-filling.
While easy to state, this intuition is difficult to substantiate. In fact, to our knowledge, there is no
integral algorithm in the online matching literature prior to our work which successful integrates
ideas from Water-filling. To explain our algorithm, we need the following equivalent interpretations
of Ranking and Water-filling from the online primal dual technique (see, e.g., Devanur et al. [7]).
• Ranking: Draw a random number yu ∈ [0, 1] for each vertex u. Then, if v is matched to
vertex u at u’s deadline, they split one unit of gain. Vertex v keeps g(yv) = e
yv−1 to itself,
and offers 1−g(yv) to u. For each vertex u which stays unmatched till its deadline, it matches
to the offline neighbor who offers the most, i.e., the one with the smallest yv.
• Water-filling: For each vertex u, let xu ∈ [0, 1] denote its matched portion, a.k.a. its water
level. Then, if v is matched to vertex u at u’s deadline by some infinitesimal amount , they
split the gain of . Vertex v keeps f(xv) = e
xv−1 times  to itself, and offers
(
1− f(xv)
)
 to
u. For each vertex u which is not fully matched by its deadline, it fractionally matches to the
least matched offline neighbors to maximize the total offer.
For any nondecreasing f and g, we define a hybrid algorithm called Balance Ranking as follows.
• Balanced Ranking: For each vertex u, draw a random number yu ∈ [0, 1]. Let xu be the
probability that u is matched, a.k.a. its water level. Then, if v is matched to another vertex
u at u’s deadline, they split one unit of gain. Vertex v keeps f(xv) + g(yv) to itself, and offers
1− f(xv)− g(yv) to u, where xv is v’s water level after u’s deadline. For each vertex u which
stays unmatched till its deadline, it matches to the offline neighbor who offers the most.
While the algorithm is a simple combination the alternative interpretations of Ranking and
Water-filling, it is crucial to match each vertex based on the water levels of the neighbors after the
matching decision of the current vertex. We show in Section 3.1 that it is a well-defined algorithm.
Then, we analyze Balanced Ranking under the online primal dual framework and design the
functions f and g by solving a differential equation arose from the analysis. See Section 3.3.
Theorem 1.1. Balanced Ranking is 0.569-competitive for fully online matching on bipartite graphs.
Beating Water-filling. We start with an observation that Water-filling works in an even harder
model, where an edge is revealed to the algorithm only when an endpoint reaches the deadline. In
fact, the hardness result by Huang et al. [14] implies that Water-filling is optimal in the harder
model. The observation suggests, however, Water-filling gives up the information about the edges
among the vertices which have arrived but have not yet reached the deadlines. Intuitively, we shall
be able to improve the competitive ratio by taking such information into account. Our algorithm
utilizes the information implicitly by eagerly matching vertices partially on the arrivals. Indeed, the
eager matches are precisely among vertices that have arrived but have not reached the deadlines.
For any nondecreasing function f , define the Eager Water-filling algorithm as follows.
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• Eager Water-filling: On the arrival of each vertex u, match it fractionally to the least
matched offline neighbors v as long as v’s offer is larger than what u wants for itself at the
current water level, i.e., 1− f(xv) ≥ f(xu). If a vertex u is not fully matched by its deadline,
match it fractionally to the least matched offline neighbors to maximize the total offer.
We can naturally interpret the algorithm as having vertex u make decisions assuming the graph
stays as it is. Suppose some neighbor v satisfies 1−f(xv) ≥ f(xu) on u’s arrival. On the one hand,
an eager match with v offers 1 − f(xv) to u per unit of match. On the other hand, if u opts to
wait, it risks getting matched at some other vertex’s deadline in which case u keeps only f(xu) per
unit of match, inferior to an eager match with v. Further, v may be matched by some other vertex
while u waits. Finally, even if none of these happens, u at best has the same options at its deadline
compared to the eager matches on its arrival, assuming the graph stays the same. In sum, u shall
fractionally match to v on its arrival as in Eager Water-filling.
Again, we analyze Eager Water-filling under the online primal dual framework and design the
function f by solving a differential equation arose from the analysis. See Section 4.
Theorem 1.2. Eager Water-filling is 0.592-competitive for fractional fully online matching.
This result separates fully online matching with another model called general vertex arrival by
Wang and Wong [23] because of a 0.5914 upper bound on the best possible competitive ratio in the
latter model by Buchbinder et al. [5]. Intriguingly, general vertex arrival is essentially fully online
matching restricted to eager matches only. In other words, we obtain the separation by forfeiting
part of the flexibility to defer decisions till the deadlines, and by incorporating eager matches which
are allowed in the general vertex arrival model in the first place.
1.2 Other Related Works
The analysis of Ranking in online bipartite matching has been refined and simplified in a series of
papers by Goel and Mehta [11], Birnbaum and Mathieu [3], and Devanur et al. [7]. In particular,
the online primal dual framework by Devanur et al. [7] has been the backbone of the competitive
analysis in fully online matching including those in this paper.
Many variants of online bipartite matching have been introduced. Mehta et al. [21] proposed
the first generalization called AdWords motivated by online advertising, which has been simplified
and generalized under online primal dual [4, 6]. Aggarwal et al. [1] considered the vertex-weighted
problem and extended Ranking to this model. Feldman et al. [9] investigated the fractional edge-
weighted case. Their algorithm can be seen as an adaptation of Water-filling, and the analysis
was simplified by Devanur et al. [8]. Mehta and Panigrahi [20] introduced a model with stochastic
rewards and the results were later improved by Mehta et al. [22] and Huang and Zhang [12]. Some
of the models have also been studied under the assumption of a random arrival order [15, 17, 19].
Besides fully online matching and general vertex arrival, there is an even harder edge arrival
model. Recently, Gamlath et al. [10] proved that the trivial 0.5-competitive greedy algorithm is
the best possible. They also obtained the first integral algorithm that breaks the 0.5 barrier in
the general vertex arrival model. Prior to that, there were some positive results for special cases
of edge arrival, e.g., when the graph is a forest [5]. The fully online matching problem is closely
related to the online windowed matching problem by Ashlagi et al. [2], which can be viewed as an
edge-weighted version of fully online matching under the first-in-first-out assumption.
3
2 Preliminaries
Model. Consider an undirected graph G = (V,E). Initially, the algorithm has no information
about G. Then, we proceed in 2|V | steps, each of which is one of the following two kinds:
• Arrival of a vertex u: The algorithm observes the edges between u and the previously arrived
vertices. This is the earliest step when u can be matched.
• Deadline of a vertex u: This is the last step when u can be matched. We guarantee that all
neighbors of u arrive before u’s deadline.3
The goal is to maximize the size of the matching. Following the standard competitive analysis,
an algorithm is Γ-competitive for some 0 ≤ Γ ≤ 1, if for any fully online matching instance, the
expected size of its matching is at least Γ times the optimal matching in hindsight.
Observe that fully online matching generalizes the model of Karp et al. [18], because the latter
can be seen as having the offline vertices arrive at the beginning and leave at the end, and letting
the deadline of each online vertex be right after its arrival.
Integral vs. Fractional Algorithms. An integral algorithm must match each vertex u in whole
to another vertex, although the matching decisions could be randomized. A fractional algorithm,
however, may match a vertex u fractionally to multiple vertices, e.g., 12 to v1,
1
4 to v2, and another
1
4 to v3, as long as the total amount is at most 1.
Matching LP. For any edge (u, v) ∈ E, let xuv be the probability/fraction that edge (u, v) is
matched by the algorithm. Consider the following standard matching LP and its dual:
max :
∑
(u,v)∈E xuv min :
∑
u∈V αu
s.t.
∑
v:(u,v)∈E xuv ≤ 1 ∀u ∈ V s.t. αu + αv ≥ 1 ∀(u, v) ∈ E
xuv ≥ 0 ∀(u, v) ∈ E αu ≥ 0 ∀u ∈ V
Let P and D denote the primal and dual objectives respectively. Observe that by the above
choice of xuv’s, P also equals the expected size of the algorithm’s matching.
Randomized Online Primal Dual Framework. An online primal dual algorithm maintains
not only a matching but also a dual assignment online.
Lemma 2.1 (Devanur et al. [7]). An online primal dual algorithm is Γ-competitive if we have:
• Approximate dual feasibility in expectation: ∀(u, v) ∈ E, E[αu]+ E[αv] ≥ Γ;
• Reverse weak duality in expectation: P ≥ E[D].
The algorithms in this paper will satisfy reverse weak duality in expectation with equality. This
is because whenever an edge (u, v) is matched by our algorithms, the increment in matching size is
split between the dual variables αu and αv of the two endpoints.
3Consider the ride-hailing example. The guarantee effectively means that, for instance, a driver on a day shift
cannot be matched with a passenger in the evening.
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3 Balanced Ranking
This section presents the Balanced Ranking algorithm, which is a hybrid algorithm building on both
Ranking and Water-filling for fully online matching on bipartite graphs, and prove Theorem 1.1.
3.1 Matching with Ranks and Lookahead Water Levels
Recall the primal dual interpretations of Ranking and Water-filling as follows. Ranking fixes a
nondecreasing function g, and draws a random rank yu ∈ [0, 1] for each vertex u. At the deadline
of each vertex u, if u is not matched yet the algorithm matches it to its neighbor v with the largest
offer 1− g(yv). Water-filling maintains the matched fraction xu ∈ [0, 1] of each vertex u, a.k.a. its
water level, and matches u fractionally to the neighbors with the largest offers 1−f(xv) per unit of
match for some nondecreasing function f . Hence, a natural hybrid algorithm is to define the offer
of each vertex v to be 1 − g(yv) − f(xv), and to match the neighbor with the largest offer. Here,
the water level xv in a randomized integral algorithm is the probability that v is matched; this is
equivalent to the probability that it is passive since any relevant v has not reached its deadline.
Lookahead Water Levels. Observe, however, the water levels change over time. Therefore, we
need to further elaborate at what time we evaluate the water levels xv’s in the hybrid algorithm.
Suppose we are to match a vertex u which stays unmatched by its deadline. The first instinct may
be to use the current water levels right before the deadline of u. Surprisingly, the attempt fails
according to our analysis. We instead consider the water levels right after the deadline of u, which
we call the lookahead water levels. Intuitively, balancing the lookahead water levels keeps as many
options available as possible to hedge against all future possibilities.
To avoid confusion, we use x
(u)
v to denote v’s water level right after u’s deadline. It exactly
equals to the probability that v is passive after u’s deadline.
Computing Lookahead Water Levels. The algorithm is still incomplete as it involves circular
definitions. The lookahead water levels x
(u)
v ’s depend on the matching decision at u’s deadline,
which is made based on the lookahead water levels x
(u)
v ’s. Next we argue this is not only well
defined but further efficiently computable up to high accuracy. Assuming:
• f is 1-Lipschitz i.e., f(x)− f(y) ≤ x− y for any x ≥ y ∈ [0, 1];
• g is 1100 -reverse Lipschitz, i.e., g(x)− g(y) ≥ x−y100 for any x ≥ y ∈ [0, 1].
The constants 1 and 1100 are arbitrary so long as the former is not too small and the latter is not
too large. They are only for the convenience in the definition of the algorithm and are not binding
constraints in our analysis. Even if not stated explicitly, there is some optimal choice of f and g in
our competitive analysis with the above Lipschitz and reverse Lipschitz properties.
Lemma 3.1. Suppose the algorithm is well defined before u’s deadline. In poly(|V |, 1 ) time, we can
compute f̂v ∈ [0, 1] for all v ∈ V , such that whenever u stays unmatched by its deadline, matching
u to vertex v with the largest 1− g(yv)− f̂v leads to water levels x(u)v ’s with f̂v −  ≤ f(x(u)v ) ≤ f̂v.
Proof. We start with the trivial overestimates f̂v = 1 for all v ∈ V . Then, we iteratively refine them
while keeping the invariant that they are overestimates. That is, whenever u stays unmatched by
its deadline, matching u to the vertex v with the largest 1− g(yv)− f̂v leads to water levels x(u)v ’s
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Algorithm 1 Balanced Ranking, with Dual Assignments
at u’s arrival:
draw rank yu ∈ [0, 1] uniformly at random
at u’s deadline, if it is unmatched:
compute the lookahead water levels x
(u)
v for all v ∈ V (Lemma 3.1)
match u to the unmatched neighbor v with the largest 1− g(yv)− f(x(u)v )
let αu = 1− g(yv)− f(x(u)v ) and αv = g(yv) + f(x(u)v )
such that f(x
(u)
v ) ≤ f̂v. Finally, we bound the time complexity by proving that the sum of the
estimates, i.e.,
∑
v∈V f̂v, decreases at least linearly.
Concretely, whenever there is a vertex v with f̂v − f(x(u)v ) > , decrease the estimate f̂v by

101 . Here, we can compute x
(u)
v up to high enough accuracy from sample runs of the algorithm by
standard concentration bounds. In doing so, the water level x
(u)
v increases and the water levels x
(u)
w
for all w /∈ {u, v} weakly decreases.
We first argue that the invariant still holds. It suffices to consider v because for any other vertex
the water level weakly decreases and the estimate stays the same. Next we show that the water level
of v increases by at most 100101 and thus, maintains the invariant. Equivalently, we claim that the
probability v is matched at u’s deadline increases by at most 100101 , which is true even conditioned
on the ranks ~y-v of the other vertices. By decreasing f̂v by

101 , the threshold g(yv) above which v
is picked by u, increases by the same amount. This in turn increases the threshold rank yv by at
most 100101 because g is
1
100 -reverse Lipschitz. Since yv is uniform from [0, 1], we conclude that the
probability that v is matched at u’s deadline increases by at most 100101 , conditioned on any ~y-v.
Finally, the algorithm terminates in O( |V | ) iterations, because the sum of the estimates, i.e.,∑
v∈V f̂v, decreases by at at least Ω() per iteration and it is between 0 and |V |.
Our analysis degrades gracefully in the error term  in the above lemma. For simplicity, the
rest of the section assumes the limit case when f(x
(u)
v ) = f̂v. See Algorithm 1.
3.2 Notations and Basic Properties
Our analysis of Balanced Ranking builds on the approach of Huang et al. [13, 14]. This section
adopts some notations from their analysis, and establishes several basic properties of Ranking that
continue to hold for Balanced Ranking.
In the following, for any instance G and any realization of ranks ~y, let MG(~y) be the matching
produced by Balanced Ranking. Let G-u be the instance with u removed from G. If G is clear in
the context, we omit the subscript to write MG(~y) as M(~y), and MG-u(~y-u) as M(~y-u). We remark
that when running Balanced Ranking on instance G-u, the lookahead water levels remain defined
by instance G. In other words, in the thought experiment that removes u, we assume that the
ranks and lookahead water levels of vertices other than u remain unchanged.
Definition 3.1 (Active and Passive). If an edge (u, v) is matched in M(~y) at u’s deadline, we say
that u is active and v is passive.
The roles of active and passive vertices in the analysis are similar to the online and offline
vertices respectively in the model of Karp et al. [18].
A main structural property of Ranking is the alternating path property that characterizes how
the matching changes when the rank of a vertex changes. It also holds to Balanced Ranking.
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Lemma 3.2 (Alternating Path). In a bipartite instance G, if u is matched in M(~y), no neighbor
of u gets better from M(~y) to M(~y-u). Here, passive is better than active, and active is better than
unmatched. Conditioned on being passive, it is better to match a vertex with an earlier deadline.
Conditioned on being active, it is better to match a vertex v with larger 1− g(yv)− f(xv).
Proof. Recall that at the deadline of a vertex u, it chooses the available neighbor with the largest
1− g(yv)− f(x(u)v ) by Balanced Ranking. Within the proof, we only use the property that f(x(u)v )
is a globally fixed quantity that does not depends on the realization of the ranks ~y. In order words,
Balanced Ranking has the property that at the deadline of any vertex w, if z1 has higher priority
than z2 in G, i.e. 1 − g(yz1) − f(x(w)z1 ) > 1 − g(yz2) − f(x(w)z2 ), then z1 remains having higher
priority than z2 in G−u. This is the crucial property of Ranking for Lemma 2.5 of [13] to hold. The
remaining of the proof is almost verbatim to that of [13].
We prove that the symmetric difference between the matchings M(~y) and M(~y-u) is an alter-
nating path (u0 = u, u1, · · · , ul) such that
1. for all even i < l, (ui, ui+1) ∈M(~y); for all odd i < l, (ui, ui+1) ∈M(~y-u);
2. from M(~y) to M(~y-u), vertices {u1, u3, · · · } get worse, vertices {u2, u4, · · · } get better.
We prove the statement by mathematical induction on n, the total number of vertices. For the
base case when n = 2, the symmetric difference is a single edge (u, u1) and the second statement
holds since u! is matched in M(~y) but unmatched with u removed.
Suppose the lemma holds for 1, 2, · · · , n − 1. We consider the case when there are n vertices.
Let u1 be matched to u in M(~y). If we remove both u, u1 from G (let ~y′ = [0, 1]V \{u,u1} be the
resulting vector), then we have M(~y) = M(~y′) ∪ {(u, u1)}.
If u1 is unmatched in M(~y-u), we have M(~y-u) = M(~y′) and the lemma holds. Now suppose u1
is matched in M(~y-u).
By definition ~y′ is obtained by removing u1 (which is matched in ~y-u) from ~y-u. By induction
hypothesis, the symmetric difference between M(~y-u) and M(~y′) is an alternating path (u1, . . . , ul)
such that (a) for all odd i < l, we have (ui, ui+1) ∈M(~y-u); for all even i < l, we have (ui, ui+1) ∈
M(~y′); (b) from M(~y-u) to M(~y′), vertices {u2, u4, . . .} get worse, vertices {u3, u5, . . .} get better.
Hence the symmetric difference between M(~y) and M(~y-u) is the alternating path (u, u1, . . . , ul)
(recall that M(~y) = M(~y′) ∪ {(u, u1)}). Statement (a) holds, and statement (b) holds for vertices
{u2, . . . , ul}.
Now consider vertex u1, which is matched to u in M(~y), and matched to u2 in M(~y-u).
If u1 is passively matched (by u) in M(~y), then we know that u has an earlier deadline than u1.
Hence in M(~y-u), either u1 is active, or passively matched by some u2 with a deadline later than
u. In other words, u1 gets worse from M(~y) to M(~y-u).
If u1 matches u actively in M(~y), then we know that u1 has an earlier deadline than u. Hence
when u1 is considered in ~y-u, the set of unmatched vertices (except for u) is identical as in M(~y).
Consequently, u1 actively matches some vertex u2 with 1− g(yu2)− f(x(u1)u2 ) ≤ 1− g(yu)− f(x(u1)u )
(otherwise u1 will not match u in M(~y)). In other words, u1 gets worse from M(~y) to M(~y-u).
Next, we define the an important set of concepts called marginal ranks.
Definition 3.2 (Marginal Rank). For any instance G, any vertex u, and any ranks ~y-u of other
vertices, the marginal rank of u w.r.t. G and ~y-u, denoted by λu(G, ~y-u), is the largest rank of u
such that it is passive, i.e., λu(G, ~y-u) = sup
{
yu : u is passive in M(yu, ~y-u)
}
.
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(a) General case when θ < 1.
!0 1
1
$
!, # match
# passive! passive# passive
! passive
(b) Degenerate case when θ = 1.
Figure 1: The horizontal and vertical axes correspond to yu, yv respectively.
For any pair of neighbors (u, v) where u’s deadline is earlier than v’s, we focus on the instance
up to the deadline of u. For simplicity, we assume u’s deadline to be the end of the instance and
define the following marginal ranks with respect to the instance right after u’s deadline.
Definition 3.3 (Marginal Ranks τ and γ). Fix any instance G, any edge (u, v), and any ranks ~y-uv
of the vertices other than u and v. Let τ = λu(G-v, ~y-uv) be the marginal rank of u w.r.t. instance
G-v with v removed, and ranks ~y-uv. Similarly, let γ = λv(G-u, ~y-uv).
Definition 3.4 (Marginal Rank θ). Fix any instance G, any edge (u, v) in which u has an earlier
deadline, any rank yu of u, and any ranks ~y-uv of the vertices other than u and v. Let θ(yu) =
λv(G, (yu, ~y-uv)) be the marginal rank of v w.r.t. G and ranks (yu, ~y-uv).
In fact we are only interested in θ(yu) for yu > τ . The next lemma states that it suffices to
consider a single value θ.
Lemma 3.3. There exists θ ≥ γ such that θ(yu) = θ for any yu > τ .
Proof. Consider the graph with v removed and yu = τ
+. By the definition of τ , u remains un-
matched before its deadline. Consider inserting v with yv ∈ (γ, 1). According to the definition of
γ, v must also be unmatched before u’s deadline. That is, for any yu ∈ (τ, 1) and yv ∈ (γ, 1) , both
u, v are unmatched before u’s deadline. Note that at this moment, the rank of u does not play any
role for its decision. Hence, there exists a common θ such that v would matched by u iff yv < θ.
We remark that θ may be 1, in which case v is passive regardless of its rank yv. We will treat
as a degenerate case and will handle it separately in the analysis (see Lemma 3.4 and Figure 1b).
The marginal ranks τ , γ, and θ provide a characterization of the matching results of u and v
as their ranks change. This is summarized in the following lemma, whose counterpart for Ranking
were shown as Lemma 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 in Huang et al. [14]. See also Figure 1 for a more visualized
illustration.
Lemma 3.4. For any instance G, any edge (u, v) where u has an earlier deadline than v, any
ranks ~y-uv of other vertices, and the corresponding marginal ranks τ , γ, and θ, we have:
• u is passive when yu ∈ (0, τ) and yv ∈ (0, 1);
• v is passive when yv ∈ (0, γ) and yu ∈ (0, 1);
• for any yu ∈ (τ, 1), v is matched if and only if yv ∈ (0, θ);
• for any yu ∈ (τ, 1) and yv ∈ (γ, θ), u actively matches v;
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• for any yu ∈ (τ, 1) and yv ∈ (θ, 1), αu ≥ 1 − g(θ) − f(x(u)v ), i.e., u’s gain is at least what v
offers at its marginal rank yv = θ;
• when θ < 1, u is matched when yu ∈ (τ, 1) and yv ∈ (0, γ); if we further have u is active,
then αu ≥ 1− g(θ)− f(x(u)v ).
Proof. We prove the statements sequentially. By the definition of τ , u is passively matched when
yu ≤ τ and v is removed from the graph. By Lemma 3.2, inserting v (with any rank) to the graph
cannot make u worse. Hence, u must be passive. Similarly, v is passive when yv ≤ γ. This finishes
the proof of the first and the second statements.
The third and the fourth statements hold by the definition of θ. Furthermore, consider when
yu ∈ (τ, 1) and yv = θ+, u has v as a candidate but decides to choose another vertex z. Note that
v offers g(θ) + f(x
(u)
v ). We have αu = 1 − g(yz) − f(x(u)z ) ≥ 1 − g(θ) − f(x(u)v ). When we further
increase the rank yv, u’s matching status shall not change. This concludes the fifth statement.
Finally, when θ < 1, consider the graph with v removed and when yu ∈ (τ, 1). This is equivalent
to the case when yv > θ and according to the previous discussion, u matches a vertex z and
αu ≥ 1 − g(θ) − f(x(u)v ). By Lemma 3.2, after inserting vertex v with rank yv ∈ (0, γ), u’s
matching status becomes no worse than actively choosing z. In other words, u must be matched
when yu ∈ (τ, 1) and yv ∈ (0, γ). Furthermore, if u is active, αu does not decrease, i.e. αu ≥
1− g(yz)− f(x(u)z ) ≥ 1− g(θ)− f(x(u)v ).
3.3 Analysis of Balanced Ranking
Recall the randomized online primal dual framework as in Lemma 2.1. Further recall that reverse
weak duality in expectation holds trivially with equality by our definition of the dual variables. It
remains to show approximate dual feasibility in expectation, i.e., to lower bound E
[
αu+αv
]
. Since
the dual variables depend on functions f and g, the lower bound will also be expressed in terms of
these functions. It shall not be surprising that the contribution from g is identical to the bound by
Huang et al. [14]. After all, the algorithm degenerates to Ranking if we let f(x) ≡ 0. For brevity,
we denote the lower bound by Huang et al. [14] as a function G : [0, 1]3 → [0, 1] as
G(τ, γ, θ)
def
=

∫ τ
0
g(yu)dyu +
∫ γ
0
g(yv)dyv +
(
1− τ) · (1− γ − (1− θ)g(θ))
+ γ ·
∫ 1
τ
min
{
(1− g(θ)), g(yu)
}
dyu, θ < 1 ;∫ τ
0
g(yu)dyu +
∫ γ
0
g(yv)dyv + (1− τ) · (1− γ) θ = 1 .
(1)
We lower bound the approximate dual feasibility in the following main technical lemma.
Observe that the bound G(τ, γ, θ) in Eqn. (1) is local, in the sense that it is achieved by taking
expectation over yu and yv only, for an arbitrarily fixed ~y-u,v. In contrast, our lower bound in
Eqn. (2) is global, in the sense that we need to take expectation of G(τ, γ, θ) over ~y-u,v. Additionally
the bound due to function f is also global, as it takes as input the lookahead water levels.
Lemma 3.5. For any edge (u, v) in which u has an earlier deadline, we have:
E
[
αu + αv
] ≥ E[G(τ, γ, θ)]+ F (xu, x(u)v ) , (2)
where F is defined as:
F (xu, x
(u)
v )
def
=
∫ xu
0
f(x)dx+
∫ x(u)v
0
f(x)dx− (1− xu) · f(x(u)v ) .
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Recall that xu = Pr
[
u passive
]
and x
(u)
v = Pr
[
v passive after u’s deadline
]
.
Proof. We first fix arbitrary ranks ~y-uv of all vertices but u, v and define τ, γ, θ w.r.t. ~y-uv. We
prove that
E
yu,yv
[αu+αv] ≥ G(τ, γ, θ)+ E
yu,yv
[
1[u passive]·f(x′u)+1[v passive]·f(x′v)−1[u active]·f(x(u)v )
]
. (3)
Remark that we use x′u = x
(w)
u to denote u’s water level right after it is passively matched to w
and similarly x′v = x
(w′)
v to denote v’s water level right after it is passively matched to w′. Noticed
that x′u, x′v depend on the ranks ~y.
Then, we consider the following two cases depending on whether θ = 1.
Case 1: θ < 1. We first study the non degenerate case. Referring to Figure 1a, we have
Eyu,yv [αu + αv] ≥
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
(
1[u passive] · f(x′u) + 1[v passive] · f(x′v)
)
dyudyv
+
∫ τ
0
g(yu)dyu +
∫ γ
0
g(yv)dyv + (1− τ)
(
(θ − γ)(1− f(pv)) + (1− θ)(1− g(θ)− f(x(u)v ))
)
+
∫ γ
0
∫ 1
τ
(
1[u passive] · g(yu) + 1[u active] · (1− g(θ)− f(x(u)v ))
)
dyudyv.
• The terms in the first line corresponds to all f(·) terms when u, v are passively matched.
• The terms ∫ τ0 g(yu)dyu and ∫ γ0 g(yv)dyv correspond to the gain of αu and αv when yu < τ and
yv < γ respectively. By the first and the second statements of Lemma 3.4, u is passive when
yu < τ and v is passive when yv < γ. We only write the g(·) terms since we have counted the
f(·) terms in the first line of the equation.
• The term (1− τ) · (θ − τ) · (1− f(x(u)v )) corresponds to the gain of αu + αv when yu ∈ (τ, 1)
and yv ∈ (γ, θ). Note that u, v matches each other in this region by the fourth statement of
Lemma 3.4. However, we subtract f(x
(u)
v ) from the gain since we have counted it in the first
line of the equation.
• The term (1− τ) · (1− θ) · (1− g(θ)− f(x(u)v )) corresponds to the gain of αu when yu ∈ (τ, 1)
and yv ∈ (θ, 1) by the fifth statement of Lemma 3.4.
• The term in the last line corresponds to the gain of αu when yu ∈ (τ, 1) and yv ∈ (0, γ).
By the last statement of Lemma 3.4, u is either passive (αu = g(yu) + f(x
′
u)) or active
(αu ≥ 1 − g(θ) − f(x(u)v )). When u is passive, we subtract the f(x′u) term since we have
counted it in the first line of the equation.
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Observe that (−f(x(u)v )) appears only when u is active. Therefore,
Eyu,yv [αu + αv] ≥
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
(
1[u passive] · f(x′u) + 1[v passive] · f(x′v)− 1[u active] · f(x(u)v )
)
dyudyv
+
∫ τ
0
g(yu)dyu +
∫ γ
0
g(yv)dyv + (1− τ) · (θ − γ + (1− θ)(1− g(θ)))
+
∫ γ
0
∫ 1
τ
(
1[u passive] · g(yu) + 1[u active] · (1− g(θ))
)
dyudyv
≥
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
(
1[u passive] · f(x′u) + 1[v passive] · f(x′v)− 1[u active] · f(x(u)v )
)
dyudyv
+
∫ τ
0
g(yu)dyu +
∫ γ
0
g(yv)dyv + (1− τ) · (θ − γ + (1− θ)(1− g(θ)))
+
∫ γ
0
∫ 1
τ
min{g(yu), 1− g(θ)}dyudyv
= E
yu,yv
[
1[u passive] · f(x′u) + 1[v passive] · f(x′v)− 1[u active] · f(x(u)v )
]
+G(τ, γ, θ).
Case 2: θ = 1. The only difference between the two cases is that we no longer have the gain of
αu when yu ∈ (τ, )] and yv ∈ (0, γ). Referring to Figure 1b, we have
Eyu,yv [αu + αv] ≥
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
(
1[u passive] · f(x′u) + 1[v passive] · f(x′v)
)
dyudyv
+
∫ τ
0
g(yu)dyu +
∫ γ
0
g(yv)dyv + (1− τ) · (1− γ) · (1− f(x(u)v ))
≥
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
(
1[u passive] · f(x′u) + 1[v passive] · f(x′v)− 1[u active] · f(x(u)v )
)
dyudyv
+
∫ τ
0
g(yu)dyu +
∫ γ
0
g(yv)dyv + (1− τ) · (1− γ)
= E
yu,yv
[
1[u passive] · f(x′u) + 1[v passive] · f(x′v)− 1[u active] · f(x(u)v )
]
+G(τ, γ, θ).
Next, taking expectations over the ranks ~y-uv, we have
E
~y-uv
[
E
yu,yv
[
1[u passive] · f(x′u) + 1[v passive] · f(x′v)− 1[u active] · f(x(u)v )
]]
=E
~y
[
1[u passive] · f(x′u)
]
+ E
~y
[
1[v passive] · f(x′v)
]
− E
~y
[
1[v active] · f(x(u)v )
]
≥E
~y
[
1[u passive] · f(x′u)
]
+ E
~y
[
1[u passive] · f(x′v)
]
− (1− xu) · f(x(u)v ). (4)
Let v1, . . . , vk be all neighbors of u whose deadlines are before u’s and let them be enumerated
according to the order of deadlines. Recall that x
(vi)
u is the water level of u after vi’s deadline. By
definition, we have x
(vi)
u = Pr[u passive at vi]. Moreover x
(vi)
u − x(vi−1)u = Pr[u is matched by vi].
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(For notation simplicity, let x
(v0)
u = 0.) Thus,
E
~y
[
1[u passive] · f(x′u)
]
=
k∑
i=1
Pr[u is mathced by vi] · f(x(vi)u )
=
k∑
i=1
(x(vi)u − x(vi−1)u ) · f(x(vi)u ) ≥
∫ xu
0
f(x′u)dx
′
u,
where the inequality comes from the monotonicity of f . Similarly,
E
~y
[
1[v passive] · f(x′v)
]
≥
∫ x(u)v
0
f(x′v)dx
′
v.
We conclude the proof by combining Equation (3) and (4):
E
~y
[αu + αv] ≥ E
~y-uv
[
G(τ, γ, θ) + E
yu,yv
[
1[u passive] · f(x′u) + 1[v passive] · f(x′v)− 1[u active] · f(x(u)v )
]]
≥ E
~y-uv
[G(τ, γ, θ)] +
∫ xu
0
f(x)dx+
∫ x(u)v
0
f(x)dx− (1− xu) · f(x(u)v ).
Failed Attempt: Handling f and g Separately. It remains to design functions f and g so
that the RHS of Eqn. (2) is at least the competitive ratio Γ. Suppose we do not have any control for
the marginal ranks τ , γ, θ and water levels xu, x
(u)
v , i.e., they can take any arbitrary combination of
values in [0, 1]. Then, the designs of f and g become two separate problems. Huang et al. [14] found
the optimal g such that minτ,γ,θ{G(τ, γ, θ)} = Ω ≈ 0.567 to show that Ranking is Ω-competitive.
Unfortunately, the bound F (xu, x
(u)
v ) for any nondecreasing function f is at most 0 at xu = 0.
In order to beat the Ω competitive ratio, which is proved tight for Ranking [14], it is crucial to
establish a connection between the marginal ranks and the water levels.
Binding Marginal Ranks and Waterlevels. Fortunately, the marginal ranks threshold ranks
τ , γ, θ and water levels xu, x
(u)
v are not arbitrary. Recall from the first conclusion of Lemma 3.4
that u is passive for all yu ∈ [τ, 1] and yv ∈ [0, 1]. Hence conditioned on any ~y-u, the probability
that u is passive is at least τ . Taking the expectation over ~y-u yields the following lemma.
Lemma 3.6. For any edge (u, v) in which u has an earlier deadline, we have E
[
τ
] ≤ xu.
Our Final Plan. To utilize the above relation between τ and xu, we introduce an auxiliary
convex function ` : [0, 1] → [0, 1] such that `(τ) lower bounds minγ≤θ{G(τ, γ, θ)}. Then, we can
lower bound the first term on the RHS of Eqn. (2) as:
E
[
G(τ, γ, θ)
] ≥ E[`(τ)] ≥ `(E[τ]) . (convexity of `)
Further observe that F (xu, x
(u)
v ) is nondecreasing in xu. We have F
(
xu, x
(u)
v
) ≥ F (E[τ], x(u)v ) by
Lemma 3.6. It remains to lower bound `
(
E
[
τ
])
+ F
(
E
[
τ
]
, x
(u)
v
)
, for any E
[
τ
]
and x
(u)
v .
A set of sufficient conditions for Γ-competitiveness w.r.t. functions f , g, and the competitive
ratio Γ is summarized as the next lemma. The proof of Lemma 3.7 is deferred to Appendix A.
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Lemma 3.7. There are increasing function g : [0, 1] → [0, 1], non-decreasing function f : [0, 1] →
[0, 1] and a convex function ` : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] such that for Γ = 0.5690:
∀τ, γ ∈ [0, 1], ∀θ ∈ [γ, 1) : ∫ τ0 g(yu)dyu + ∫ γ0 g(yv)dyv + (1− τ)(1− γ − (1− θ)g(θ))
+
∫ 1
τ γ ·min
{
g(yu), 1− g(θ)
}
dyu ≥ `(τ) ;
∀τ, γ ∈ [0, 1] : ∫ τ0 g(yu)dyu + ∫ γ0 g(yv)dyv + (1− τ)(1− γ) ≥ `(τ) ;
∀E[τ ], x(u)v ∈ [0, 1] : `(E[τ ]) +
∫ E[τ ]
0 f(x)dx+
∫ x(u)v
0 f(x)dx−
(
1− E[τ ])f(x(u)v ) ≥ Γ ;
∀x ∈ [0, 1],∀y ∈ [0, x] : f(x)− f(y) ≤ x− y ;
∀x ∈ [0, 1],∀y ∈ [0, x] : g(x)− g(y) ≥ x− y
100
;
g(1) + f(1) ≤ 1 .
Theorem 3.1 (Theorem 1.1 Restated). Balanced Ranking with the functions f and g chosen in
Lemma 3.7 is 0.569-competitive for fully online matching on bipartite graphs.
Proof. We have discussed all the ingredients in this section. It remains to put them together. Let
f , g, and ` be the functions constructed in Lemma 3.7. Observe that f, g satisfy the Lipschitzness
and reverse Lipschitzness assumed in Section 3.1. Our algorithm is well-defined. Since the function
f and g are nonnegative and g(1) + f(1) ≤ 1, the dual variables αu’s are nonnegative.
Recall that xu = Pr
[
u passive
]
and x
(u)
v = Pr
[
v passive after u’s deadline
]
. Approximate dual
feasibility in expectation follows by Lemma 3.5 and Lemma 3.7 as
E
[
αu + αv
] ≥E[G(τ, γ, θ)]+ F (xu, x(u)v ) ≥ E[`(τ)]+ F (xu, x(u)v )
≥`(E[τ ])+ F (xu, x(u)v ) ≥ `(E[τ ])+ F (E[τ ], x(u)v ) ≥ Γ = 0.5690 .
Finally, recall that reverse weak duality in expectation follows trivially with equality by our
definition of the dual variables.
4 Eager Water-Filling Algorithm
In this section we present the Eager Water-filling algorithm for fractional fully online matching
and prove Theorem 1.2. We first briefly summarize the competitive analysis of Water-filling algo-
rithm [14] to build intuition. Recall that Water-filling is a lazy algorithm that each vertex sits back
and waits until its deadline. At the deadline of a vertex u, Water-filling continuously matches u
to the unmatched neighbor with the smallest matched portion (a.k.a. water level). The algorithm
simultaneously updates the dual variables. Whenever dx fraction of edge (u, v) is matched at u’s
deadline, we increase αu, αv by (1−f(xv))dx and f(xv)dx respectively, where xv is the current water
level of v. Huang et al. [14] conclude the competitive ratio of Water-filling by showing approximate
dual feasibility with an appropriate choice of f .
The primal-dual analysis gives an intuitive economic interpretation of the Water-filling algo-
rithm. At any moment, each vertex v prices itself at f(xv) according to the current water level and
offers a share of 1− f(xv) to its neighbor. At the deadline of a vertex u, it chooses the unmatched
neighbor that is willing to give u the largest share of gain. From this viewpoint, however, Water-
filling is unnatural in the following scenario. Suppose at u’s arrival, it has an existing neighbor v
who is willing to offer a share of the gain that is larger than what u can get from being passive
matched later, i.e. 1 − f(xv) ≥ f(xu). Why would u prefer to wait as in Water-filling, instead of
grabbing v immediately? By waiting there is risk that 1) v is taken by some other vertex before
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u’s deadline and that 2) u is passively matched before its own deadline which gives a lower portion
of the gain to u. To this end, we propose the following variant of Water-filling.
Eager Water-filling. Fix an increasing function f : [0, 1] → [0, 1]. Initialize all xuv’s and αu’s
to be zero. For convenience of analysis we also fix f(0) = 0 and f(1) = 1.
1. Upon the arrival of a vertex u, u continuously matches the neighbor v with lowest water level
if f(xu) + f(xv) ≤ 1. The process increases xu and the lowest water level of neighbors of u
until f(xu) + f(xv) > 1 for all neighbor v of u.
2. At the deadline of u, u continuously matches the neighbor v with lowest water level until
xu = 1, or xv = 1 for all neighbor v of u.
Note that the second step of Eager Water-filling is the same as Water-filling.
In both steps, when we match u with its neighbor v, we consider u as the active vertex and v as
the passive vertex. When xuv increases by dx, we update the dual variables αu and αv as follows:
dαu = (1− f(xv))dx and dαv = f(xv)dx.
4.1 Analysis of Eager Water-filling
By Lemma 2.1, it suffices to show that for any pair of neighbors u and v we have αu + αv ≥ Γ
in order to prove Eager Water-filling is Γ-competitive. Unlike Balanced Ranking/Ranking, Eager
Water-filling is a deterministic algorithm and thus, no randomness is involved for the dual variables
αu’s. Fix any pair of neighbors u and v, and assume u has an earlier deadline than v.
Let pu be the water level of u right before u’s deadline. Let pv be the water level of v right
after u’s deadline. Let tu, tv be the water levels of u and v right after their arrivals, respectively.
We prove the following lower bound on the gain of u and v.
Lemma 4.1. Right after u’s deadline, we have
αv + αu ≥ tv · f(tv) +
∫ pv
tv
f(x)dx+ tu · f(tu) +
∫ pu
tu
f(x)dx+ (1− pu) · (1− f(pv)). (5)
Proof. Recall that when v arrives, v matches some neighbor actively until xv = tv. Moreover, when
xv increases (actively) from 0 to tv, the neighbor z it matches always satisfies f(xz) + f(tv) ≤ 1.
Thus when xv increases by dx the gain of v is (1−f(xz))dx ≥ f(tv)dx. Hence right after v’s arrival
we have αv ≥ tv ·f(tv). When xv further increases from tv to pv between v’s arrival and u’s deadline,
αv increases at the rate of f(xv). Thus after u’s deadline we have αv ≥ tv · f(tv) +
∫ pv
tv
f(x)dx.
Similarly, right before u’s deadline we have αu ≥ tu · f(tu) +
∫ pu
tu
f(x)dx. If pv = 1, then
(1 − pu) · (1 − f(pv)) = 0 and the statement is proved. Otherwise at u’s deadline, xu increases
(actively) from pu to 1, and u always matches a neighbor with water level at most pv. Thus after
the deadline of u we have αu ≥ tu · f(tu) +
∫ pu
tu
f(x)dx+ (1− pu) · (1− f(pv)).
Putting the lower bounds of αu and αv together concludes the proof.
Comparison with Water-filling. We make a comparison to the competitive analysis of Water-
filling by Huang et al. [14]. Let pu, pv be defined in the same way as Eager Water-filling for
Water-filling and dual variables be also updated in the same way. Observe that Water-filling is
exactly the second step of our Eager Water-filling algorithm. Huang et al. proved that
αu + αv ≥
∫ pu
0
f(x)dx+ (1− pu)(1− f(pv)) +
∫ pv
0
f(x)dx. (6)
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Observe that Eqn. (5) is at least as good as Eqn. (6), because t · f(t) ≥ ∫ t0 f(x)dx for all t.
On the other hand, we have not shown any constraint on the values of tu, tv. In the case when
tu = tv = 0, Eqn. (5) degenerates to Eqn. (6).
We continue our analysis by observing that if v arrives earlier than u then right after u’s arrival
we have f(tu) + f(xv) > 1, and xv ≤ pv. Thus we have the constraint that f(tu) + f(pv) > 1.
Similarly, if u arrives earlier than v then we have f(tv) + f(pu) > 1.
Combining the constraints on tu, pu, tv, pv with Lemma 4.1, we show that there exists function
f such that the total gain of u and v combined is strictly larger than the ratio 2−√2 that is proved
tight for Water-filling.
4.2 Reformulating the Lower Bound
It remains to find an increasing function f such that the minimum of RHS of Eqn. (5), over possible
values of tu, tv, pu, pv, is maximized. In this section we reformulate the lower bound and eliminate
tu and tv from the lower bound.
Since f is strictly increasing, it is easy to see that the RHS of Eqn. (5) is increasing w.r.t. both
tu and tv. Indeed, the function t · f(t) −
∫ t
0 f(x)dx is monotonically increasing in t. Thus the
minimum is achieved when tu and tv are minimized, subject to the constraint
f(tu) + f(pv) > 1 if v arrives earlier than u, or
f(tv) + f(pu) > 1 if u arrives earlier than v.
Let h(·) = f−1(·) be the inverse function of f . Note that h is also an increasing function defined
on [0, 1] such that h(0) = 0 and h(1) = 1. For any p ∈ [0, 1], we have∫ p
0
f(x)dx = p · f(p)−
∫ f(p)
0
h(y)dy.
Lemma 4.2. If v arrives earlier than u, then we have
αu + αv ≥ min
q
{
q · h(q)−
∫ q
0
h(y)dy + 1− q
}
.
Proof. Let qu = f(pu), qv = f(pv). Recall that if v arrives earlier than u then the minimum of RHS
of Eqn.(5) is achieved when tu = f
−1(1− f(pv)) = h(1− qv) and tv = 0:
αv + αu ≥
∫ pv
0
f(x)dx+ tu · f(tu) +
∫ pu
tu
f(x)dx+ (1− pu) · (1− f(pv)).
Observe that the derivative of RHS of the above equation over pu is f(pu) + f(pv) − 1 ≥ 0,
which implies that the minimum is achieved when pu is minimized, i.e., pu = tu. Thus we have
αv + αu ≥
∫ pv
0
f(x)dx+ tu · f(tu) + (1− tu) · (1− f(pv)).
Using tu = h(1− qv) we have f(tu) = 1− qv = 1− f(pv), which implies
αv + αu ≥
∫ pv
0
f(x)dx+ 1− f(pv) = h(qv) · qv −
∫ qv
0
h(y)dy + 1− qv.
Taking minimum of the RHS over qv yields the lemma.
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Lemma 4.3. If u arrives earlier than v, then we have
αu+αv ≥ min
qu,qv
{
qu·h(qu)−
∫ qu
0
h(y)dy+qv ·h(qv)−
∫ qv
0
h(y)dy+
∫ 1−qu
0
h(y)dy+(1−h(qu))·(1−qv)
}
.
Proof. Let qu = f(pu), qv = f(pv). If u arrives earlier than v then the minimum of RHS of Eqn.(5)
is achieved when tv = f
−1(1− f(pu)) = h(1− qu) and tu = 0:
αv + αu ≥ tv · f(tv) +
∫ pv
tv
f(x)dx+
∫ pu
0
f(x)dx+ (1− pu) · (1− f(pv))
=tv · f(tv) +
∫ pv
0
f(x)dx−
∫ tv
0
f(x)dx+
∫ pu
0
f(x)dx+ (1− pu) · (1− f(pv))
=h(1− qu) · (1− qu) +
(
h(qv) · qv −
∫ qv
0
h(y)dy
)
−
(
h(1− qu) · (1− qu)−
∫ 1−qu
0
h(y)dy
)
+
(
h(qu) · qu −
∫ qu
0
h(y)dy
)
+ (1− h(qu)) · (1− qv)
=qu · h(qu)−
∫ qu
0
h(y)dy + qv · h(qv)−
∫ qv
0
h(y)dy +
∫ 1−qu
0
h(y)dy + (1− h(qu)) · (1− qv).
Taking minimum of the RHS over qu and qv yields the lemma.
Finally, we use factor revealing lp techniques to find function h with the following property.
The proof of Lemma 4.4 is deferred to Appendix A.
Lemma 4.4. There exists an increasing function h : [0, 1] 7→ [0, 1] such that for Γ = 0.5926:
∀q ∈ [0, 1], q · h(q)−
∫ q
0
h(y)dy + 1− q ≥ Γ, (7)
∀qu, qv ∈ [0, 1], qu · h(qu)−
∫ qu
0
h(y)dy + qv · h(qv)−
∫ qv
0
h(y)dy
+
∫ 1−qu
0
h(y)dy + (1− h(qu)) · (1− qv) ≥ Γ, (8)
h(0) = 0, h(1) = 1. (9)
Theorem 4.1 (Theorem 1.2 Restated). Eager Water-filling with the function f = h−1 where h is
chosen in Lemma 4.4 is 0.592-competitive for fractional fully online matching on general graphs.
Proof. We conclude the competitive ratio of Eager Water-filling by putting the lemmas together.
Approximate dual feasibility follows by the two cases. If v arrives earlier than u, we have
αu + αv ≥min
q
{
q · h(q)−
∫ q
0
h(y)dy + 1− q
}
(Lemma 4.2)
≥Γ = 0.592 . (Eqn. (7))
If u arrives earlier than v, we have
αu + αv ≥min
qu,qv
{
qu · h(qu)−
∫ qu
0
h(y)dy + qv · h(qv)−
∫ qv
0
h(y)dy
+
∫ 1−qu
0
h(y)dy + (1− h(qu)) · (1− qv)
}
(Lemma 4.3)
≥Γ = 0.592 . (Eqn. (8))
Finally, recall that reverse weak duality follows trivially with equality by our definition of the dual
variables.
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5 Future Directions
Balanced Ranking vs. Ranking on General Graphs. An immediate next question about
Balanced Ranking is whether it is still better than Ranking on general graphs. This is beyond the
scope of the current paper since a tight analysis of Ranking remains elusive. An easier task is to
show that Balanced Ranking is strictly better than 0.5211-competitive on general graphs. We leave
these questions for future research.
Balanced Ranking with Eager Matches. Another interesting direction is to explore the power
of eager matches in integral fully online matching algorithms. There is a natural definition of Eager
Ranking where a vertex v may be eagerly matched on its arrival to a neighbor u if 1−g(yu) ≥ g(yx).
However, it is at best Ω ≈ 0.567-competitive due to the same hard instance for Ranking by Huang
et al. [13]. There is also a natural definition of Eager Balanced Ranking but its analysis seems to
require ideas beyond those in this paper.
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A Approximate Solutions to the Differential Equations
In this section, we explain in detail how we use factor revealing LP techniques to construct functions
f, g, ` in Lemma 3.7 and h in Lemma 4.4.
A.1 Proof of Lemma 3.7
Recall that we need increasing function g : [0, 1] 7→ [0, 1], non-decreasing function f : [0, 1] 7→ [0, 1],
and convex function ` : [0, 1] 7→ [0, 1] such that:
∀τ, γ ∈ [0, 1], θ ∈ [γ, 1) :
∫ τ
0
g(y)dy +
∫ γ
0
g(y)dyv +
(
1− τ)(1− γ − (1− θ)g(θ))
+ γ ·
∫ 1
τ
min
{
g(y), 1− g(θ)}dy ≥ `(τ) ; (10)
∀τ, γ ∈ [0, 1] :
∫ τ
0
g(y)dy +
∫ γ
0
g(y)dy +
(
1− τ)(1− γ) ≥ `(τ) ; (11)
∀E[τ ], x(u)v ∈ [0, 1] : `(E[τ ]) +
∫ E[τ ]
0
f(x)dx+
∫ x(u)v
0
f(x)dx− (1− E[τ ])f(x(u)v ) ≥ Γ = 0.569 ;
(12)
∀x ∈ [0, 1],∀y ∈ [0, x] : f(x)− f(y) ≤ x− y ; (13)
∀x ∈ [0, 1],∀y ∈ [0, x] : g(x)− g(y) ≥ x− y
100
; (14)
g(1) + f(1) ≤ 1 . (15)
In the following we construct functions f, g and l. For any positive integer n, let [0, 1]n denote
the set of multiples of 1n between 0 and 1:
[0, 1]n =
{
i
n
: 0 ≤ i ≤ n
}
.
Fix 0 ≤ f(0) ≤ f( 1n) ≤ . . . ≤ f(1) = 1. For each x = x¯ + zxn , where x¯ ∈ [0, 1]n and zx ∈ [0, 1),
define f(x) = (1− zx) · f(x¯) + zx · f(x¯+ 1n). That is, function f on points outside [0, 1]n is defined
to be a linear interpolation of the function values on two nearest points in [0, 1]n.
By the above definition, f is uniquely defined by {f(x)}x∈[0,1]n . In the following, we restrict
our choice of function f to be of this specific form. Similarly, we strictly functions g (resp. l) to be
defined by {g(y)}y∈[0,1]n (resp. {`(τ)}τ∈[0,1]n).
Note that for function f defined this way and any t ∈ [0, 1]n, we have∫ t
0
f(x)dx =
∑
x∈[0,1]n:x<t
f(x) + f(x+ 1n)
2n
.
Similarly, we have
∫ t
0 g(y)dy =
∑
y∈[0,1]n:y<t
g(y)+g(y+ 1
n
)
2n for all t ∈ [0, 1]n.
It remains to compute {f(x), g(x), `(x)}x∈[0,1]n that induce functions satisfying the above con-
straints. Specifically, we have the following set of discretized linear constraints.
We formulate the following linear program (LPn), in which {f(x), g(x), `(x)}x∈[0,1]n are the
variables. The objective of LPn is to maximize variable r, subject to the following constraints.
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Monotonicity. For any x ∈ [0, 1]n, x < 1:
f(x) ≤ f(x+ 1
n
) ; (16)
g(x) < g(x+
1
n
) . (17)
Boundary Condition.
f(0) ≥ 0, g(0) ≥ 0, f(1) + g(1) ≤ 1 .
Lipschitzness. For any x ∈ [0, 1]n, x < 1:
f(x+
1
n
)− f(x) ≤ 1
n
; (18)
g(x+
1
n
)− g(x) ≤ 1
n
. (19)
Reverse Lipschitzness. For any x ∈ [0, 1]n, x < 1:
g(x+
1
n
)− g(x) ≥ 1
100n
. (20)
Convexity. For any x ∈ [0, 1]n, 0 < x < 1:
`(x) ≤ 1
2
·
(
`(x− 1
n
) + `(x+
1
n
)
)
. (21)
Strengthened Constraints. For any τ, γ, θ ∈ [0, 1]n such that γ ≤ θ + 1n ≤ 1:
`(τ) +
1
2n2
≤
∫ τ
0
g(y)dy +
∫ γ
0
g(y)dy +
(
1− τ)(1− γ − (1− θ)g(θ))
+γ ·
∑
y∈[0,1]n:τ≤y<1
min
{
g(y), 1− g(θ + 1n)}+ min{g(y + 1n), 1− g(θ + 1n)}
2n
. (22)
For any τ, γ ∈ [0, 1]n:
`(τ) +
1
4n2
≤
∫ τ
0
g(y)dy +
∫ γ
0
g(y)dy +
(
1− τ)(1− γ) . (23)
For any p, q ∈ [0, 1]n:
r +
1
4n2
≤ `(p) +
∫ p
0
f(x)dx+
∫ q
0
f(x)dx− (1− p)f(q) . (24)
The following claim is verified using the Gurobi LP solver4.
Claim A.1. For n = 100, the optimal objective of LPn is at least Γ = 0.569.
4Our code is available at https://github.com/denil1111/Fully-Online-Maching-Improved-Algorithms.
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We are left to prove that the optimal solution for LPn, where {f(x), g(x), `(x)}x∈[0,1]n are the
variables, defines the desired functions f, g and `.
First, observe that the monotonicity of g and f follows from Eqn. (17) and (16) and the linear
interpolations. Similarly, the convexity of ` follows from Eqn. (21) and the linear interpolation.
The Lipschitzness of f and reverse Lipschitzness of g follows from Eqn. (18) and (20) and the linear
interpolations. The boundary condition of g(1) + f(1) ≤ 1 is explicitly stated. It remains to verify
Eqn. (10), (11) and (12).
We first prove some useful tools to ease the analysis. In the following, for any t ∈ [0, 1], we define
t¯, zt and tˆ such that t = t¯+
zt
n and tˆ = min{t¯+ 1n , 1}. In other words, t¯ and tˆ are the two points in
[0, 1]n nearest to t, where we define t¯ = tˆ = 1 for t = 1. Note that we have t = (1− zt) · t¯+ zt · tˆ and
f(t) = (1− zt) · f(t¯) + zt · f(tˆ), g(t) = (1− zt) · g(t¯) + zt · g(tˆ).
Claim A.2. For any t ∈ [0, 1], we have∫ t
0
f(x)dx−
(
(1− zt) ·
∫ t¯
0
f(x)dx+ zt ·
∫ tˆ
0
f(x)dx
)
∈ [− 1
8n2
, 0].
The same holds for function g.
Proof. By the linear interpolation definition of f ,∫ t
0
f(x)dx−
(
(1− zt) ·
∫ t¯
0
f(x)dx+ zt ·
∫ tˆ
0
f(x)dx
)
=
∫ t
t¯
f(x)dx− zt ·
∫ tˆ
t¯
f(x)dx
=
zt
2n
·
(
f(t¯) + f(t)
)
− zt
2n
·
(
f(t¯) + f(tˆ)
)
=
zt
2n
·
(
f(t)− f(tˆ)
)
=
zt(1− zt)
2n
·
(
f(t¯)− f(tˆ)
)
∈ [− 1
8n2
, 0],
where the last inequality follows by monotonicity and Lipschitzness of function f . The proof for
function g is almost identical.
A.1.1 Feasibility of Eqn. (10)
Recall that we need to prove for all τ, γ ∈ [0, 1] and θ ∈ [γ, 1), G(τ, γ, θ) ≥ `(τ), where
G(τ, γ, θ)
def
=
∫ τ
0
g(y)dy +
∫ γ
0
g(y)dy +
(
1− τ)(1− γ − (1− θ)g(θ))+ γ ∫ 1
τ
min
{
g(y), 1− g(θ)}dy.
Let τ = τ¯ + zτn , where τ¯ ∈ [0, 1]n and zτ ∈ [0, 1). Let τˆ = min{τ¯ + 1n , 1}. We define γ¯, zγ , γˆ for
γ, and θ¯, zθ, θˆ for γ similarly. By monotonicity of g, G(τ, γ, θ) is at least∫ τ
0
g(y)dy +
∫ γ
0
g(y)dy +
(
1− τ)(1− γ − (1− θ)g(θ))+ γ ∫ 1
τ
min
{
g(y), 1− g(θˆ)}dy .
We define the above equation as G1(τ, γ, θ). Note that the only difference between G and G1
is that we relax θ to θˆ in the last integration.
We prove the following four inequalities, which will be building blocks of our later analysis.
For any τ, γ, θ ∈ [0, 1], we have:
G1(τ, γ, θ) ≥ (1− zτ ) ·G1(τ¯ , γ, θ) + zτ ·G1(τˆ , γ, θ)− 1
8n2
. (25)
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G1(τ, γ, θ) ≥ (1− zγ) ·G1(τ, γ¯, θ) + zγ ·G1(τ, γˆ, θ)− 1
8n2
. (26)
G1(τ, γ, θ) ≥ (1− zθ) ·G1(τ, γ, θ¯) + zθ ·G1(τ, γ, θˆ)− 1
4n2
. (27)
Further, we will show that for any τ, θ ∈ [0, 1]n:
∫ 1
τ
min
{
g(y), 1− g(θˆ)}dy ≥ ∑
y∈[0,1]n:τ≤y<1
min
{
g(y), 1− g(θˆ)}+ min{g(y + 1n), 1− g(θˆ)}
2n
. (28)
Given the four inequalities, we prove that for all τ, γ ∈ [0, 1] and θ ∈ [γ, 1), G(τ, γ, θ) ≥ `(τ) by:
G(τ, γ, θ) ≥ G1(τ, γ, θ)
≥(1− zτ)((1− zγ)(1− zθ) ·G1(τ¯ , γ¯, θ¯)+ (1− zγ)zθ ·G1(τ¯ , γ¯, θˆ)
+ zγ
(
1− zθ
) ·G1(τ¯ , γˆ, θ¯)+ zγzθ ·G1(τ¯ , γˆ, θˆ))
+ zτ
((
1− zγ
)(
1− zθ
) ·G1(τˆ , γ¯, θ¯)+ (1− zγ)zθ ·G1(τˆ , γ¯, θˆ)
+ zγ
(
1− zθ
) ·G1(τˆ , γˆ, θ¯)+ zγzθ ·G1(τˆ , γˆ, θˆ))− 1
2n2
≥(1− zτ) · `(τ¯)+ zτ · `(τˆ) = `(τ) . (by the linear interpolation of `)
Note that the second inequality follows from Eqn. (22) and (28).
It remains to prove Eqn. (25), (26), (27) and (28).
Proof of Eqn. (25). We prove by a sequence of inequalities as follows.
G1(τ, γ, θ)−
(
(1− zτ ) ·G1(τ¯ , γ, θ)− zτ ·G1(τˆ , γ, θ)
)
=
∫ τ
0
f(x)dx−
(
(1− zτ ) ·
∫ τ¯
0
f(x)dx+ zτ ·
∫ τˆ
0
f(x)dx
)
+ γ ·
(∫ 1
τ
min
{
g(y), 1− g(θˆ)}dy
− (1− zτ ) ·
∫ 1
τ¯
min
{
g(y), 1− g(θˆ)}dy − zτ · ∫ 1
τˆ
min
{
g(y), 1− g(θˆ)}dy)
≥− 1
8n2
+ γ
(∫ τˆ
τ
min
{
g(y), 1− g(θˆ)}dy − (1− zτ )∫ τˆ
τ¯
min
{
g(y), 1− g(θˆ)}dy) (by Claim A.2)
≥− 1
8n2
. (by monotonicity of min
{
g(y), 1− g(θˆ)} w.r.t. y)
Proof of Eqn. (26). From Claim A.2, we have the following immediately.
G1(τ, γ, θ)−
(
(1− zτ ) ·G1(τ, γ¯, θ)− zτ ·G1(τ, γˆ, θ)
)
=
∫ γ
0
f(x)dx−
(
(1− zγ) ·
∫ γ¯
0
f(x)dx+ zγ ·
∫ γˆ
0
f(x)dx
)
≥ − 1
8n2
.
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Proof of Eqn. (27). It follows by a sequence of inequalities as follows.
G1(τ, γ, θ)−
(
(1− zθ) ·G1(τ, γ, θ¯) + zθ ·G1(τ, γ, θˆ)
)
=− (1− τ)((1− θ)g(θ)− (1− zθ)(1− θ¯)g(θ¯)− zθ(1− θˆ)g(θˆ))
=− (1− τ) · zθ(1− zθ)
n
(
g(θˆ)− g(θ¯)) ≥ − 1
4n2
. (by the Lipschitzness of g)
Proof of Eqn. (28). Observe that min
{
g(y), 1 − g(θˆ)} is either linear or concave within every
interval [t, t+ 1n) for t ∈ [0, 1]n. Moreover, the latter happens only when 1− g
(
θˆ) ∈ (g(t), g(t+ 1n)).
Let t∗ ∈ [0, 1]n be such that 1− g
(
θˆ) ∈ (g(t∗), g(t∗ + 1n)). If such t∗ does not exist, or t∗ < τ then
Eqn. (28) trivially holds. Otherwise for all τ ∈ [0, 1]n we have:∫ 1
τ
min
{
g(y), 1− g(θˆ)}dy − ∑
y∈[0,1]n:τ≤y<1
min
{
g(y), 1− g(θˆ)}+ min{g(y + 1n), 1− g(θˆ)}
2n
.
=
∫ t∗+ 1
n
t∗
min{g(y), 1− g(θˆ)}dy − 1
2n
(
g(t∗) + 1− g(θˆ)
)
≥ 0 .
A.1.2 Feasibility of Eqn. (11)
Recall that we need to prove for all ∀τ, γ ∈ [0, 1]: G2(τ, γ) ≥ `(τ), where
G2(τ, γ)
def
=
∫ τ
0
g(y)dy +
∫ γ
0
g(y)dy +
(
1− τ)(1− γ) .
By Claim A.2 we have
G2(τ, γ) ≥ (1− zτ ) ·G2(τ¯ , γ) + zτ ·G2(τˆ , γ)− 1
8n2
≥(1− zτ ) ·
(
(1− zγ)G2(τ¯ , γ¯) + zγG2(τ¯ , γˆ)
)
+ zτ ·
(
(1− zγ)G2(τˆ , γ¯) + zγG2(τˆ , γˆ)
)
− 1
4n2
≥(1− zτ ) · `(τ¯) + zτ · `(τˆ) = `(τ),
where the second inequality follows from Eqn. (23).
A.1.3 Feasibility of Eqn. (12)
For convenience, let p = E[τ ] and q = x(u)v . Recall that we need to prove for all p, q ∈ [0, 1] that
G3(p, q) ≥ Γ, where
G3(p, q)
def
= `(p) +
∫ p
0
f(x)dx+
∫ q
0
f(x)dx− (1− p)f(q) .
Also recall from Eqn. (24) and Claim A.1 that for any p, q ∈ [0, 1]n, we have
G3(p, q) ≥ Γ + 1
4n2
. (29)
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By Claim A.2 and linear interpolation of ` and f , for all p, q ∈ [0, 1] we have
G3(p, q) ≥ (1− zp) ·G3(p¯, q) + zp ·G3(pˆ, q)− 1
8n2
≥(1− zp)
(
(1− zq)G3(p¯, q¯) + zqG3(p¯, qˆ)
)
+ zp
(
(1− zq)G3(pˆ, q¯) + zqG3(pˆ, qˆ)
)
− 1
4n2
≥(1− zp) · Γ + zp · Γ = Γ. (by Eqn. (29).)
A.2 Proof of Lemma 4.4
Recall that we need an increasing function h such that:
∀q ∈ [0, 1], q · h(q)−
∫ q
0
h(y)dy + 1− q ≥ Γ, (30)
∀qu, qv ∈ [0, 1], qu · h(qu)−
∫ qu
0
h(y)dy + qv · h(qv)−
∫ qv
0
h(y)dy
+
∫ 1−qu
0
h(y)dy + (1− h(qu)) · (1− qv) ≥ Γ = 0.592, (31)
h(0) = 0, h(1) = 1. (32)
Fix 0 = h(0) < h( 1n) < . . . < h(1) = 1. For each y = y¯ +
zy
n , where y¯ ∈ [0, 1]n and zy ∈ [0, 1),
define h(y) = (1− zy) · h(y¯) + zy · h(y¯ + 1n). That is, function h on points outside [0, 1]n is defined
to be a linear interpolation of the function values on two nearest points in [0, 1]n.
Note that for function h defined this way and any t ∈ [0, 1]n, we have∫ t
0
h(y)dy =
∑
y∈[0,1]n:y<t
h(y) + h(y + 1n)
2n
.
It remains to determine {h(y)}y∈[0,1]n . We claim that the optimal solution for the following LP,
where {h(y)}y∈[0,1]n are the variables, defines a function h that satisfies the constraints listed in
Lemma 4.4. For convenience we define h(1 + 1n) = h(1) = 1.
(LPn) maximize r
subject to r ≤ q · h(q)− ∫ q0 h(y)dy + 1− q − 34n2 , ∀q ∈ [0, 1]n (33)
r ≤ q · h(q)− ∫ q0 h(y)dy + p · h(p)− ∫ p0 dy + ∫ 1−q0 h(y)dy
+
(
1− h(q + 1n)
) · (1− p)− 7
4n2
, ∀q, p ∈ [0, 1]n (34)
h(0) = 0, h(1) = h(1 + 1n) = 1,
h(y) < h(y + 1n), ∀y ∈ [0, 1]n, y < 1 (monotonicity)
h(y) ≥ h(y + 1n) + 2n , ∀y ∈ [0, 1]n, y < 1 (Lipschitzness)
The following claim is verified using the Gurobi LP solver. 5
Claim A.3. For n = 1000, the optimal objective of LPn is at least Γ = 0.592.
We are left to prove that the optimal solution for LPn, where {h(y)}y∈[0,1]n are the variables,
defines the desired function h. Note that the monotonicity constraint of h is implied by the
monotonicity of h(y) for y ∈ [0, 1]n and the linear interpolation of h. Further, h(0) = 0 and
5Our code is available at https://github.com/denil1111/Fully-Online-Maching-Improved-Algorithms.
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h(1) = 1 are stated explicitly in the above linear program. It remains to prove that the function h
defined by the optimal solution of LPn satisfies the constraints (30) and (31).
Let h be defined by the optimal solution {h(y)}y∈[0,1]n of LPn with n = 1000. Fix any q ∈
[0, 1]. Let q = q¯ +
zq
n , where q¯ ∈ [0, 1]n and zq ∈ [0, 1). Let qˆ = q¯ + 1n . Observe that we have
q = (1− zq) · q¯ + zq · qˆ and h(q) = (1− zq) · h(q¯) + zq · h(qˆ).
Claim A.4. Let H(q) = q · h(q)− ∫ q0 h(y)dy, we have
H(q)−
(
(1− zq) ·H(q¯) + zq ·H(qˆ)
)
∈ [− 3
4n2
, 0).
Proof. Recall that h is defined by {h(y)}y∈[0,1]n , which satisfies the constraints of LPn.
We first consider the first term q · h(q). Observe that
q · h(q)−
(
(1− zq) · q¯ · h(q¯) + zq · qˆ · h(qˆ)
)
=
zq(1− zq)
n
·
(
h(q¯)− h(qˆ)
)
∈ [− 1
2n2
, 0),
where the last step follows from the monotonicity and Lipschitzness of {h(y)}y∈[0,1]n .
Next we consider the second term
∫ q
0 h(y)dy. Observe that∫ q
0
h(y)dy −
(
(1− zq)
∫ q¯
0
h(y)dy + zq
∫ qˆ
0
h(y)dy
)
=
∫ q
q¯
h(y)dy − zq
∫ qˆ
q¯
h(y)dy
=
zq
2n
·
(
h(q¯) + h(q)
)
− zq
2n
·
(
h(q¯) + h(qˆ)
)
=
zq(1− zq)
2n
·
(
h(q¯)− h(qˆ)
)
∈ [− 1
4n2
, 0).
Combining the two lower bounds concludes the proof.
A.2.1 Feasibility of Eqn. (30)
By Eqn. (33) and Claim A.3, we have
H(q) + 1− q ≥ (1− zq) ·
(
H(q¯) + 1− q¯ − 3
4n2
)
+ zq ·
(
H(qˆ) + 1− qˆ − 3
4n2
)
≥ (1− zq) · Γ + zq · Γ = Γ.
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A.2.2 Feasibility of Eqn. (31)
Let p¯, pˆ, zp (for p) be defined similarly as q¯, qˆ, zq (for q). Note that by Claim A.4, we have
H(q) +H(p) +
∫ 1−q
0
h(y)dy + (1− h(q)) · (1− p)
≥H(q) +H(p) +
∫ 1−q
0
h(y)dy + (1− h(qˆ)) · (1− p)
≥
(
(1− zq) ·H(q¯) + zq ·H(qˆ)− 3
4n2
)
+
(
(1− zp) ·H(p¯) + zp ·H(pˆ)− 3
4n2
)
+
(
(1− zq) ·
∫ 1−q¯
0
h(y)dy + zq ·
∫ 1−qˆ
0
h(y)dy +
zq(1− zq)
2n
· (h(1− qˆ)− h(1− q¯))
)
+
(
(1− zq) · (1− h(qˆ))(1− p¯) + zq · (1− h(qˆ))(1− pˆ)
≥
(
(1− zq) ·H(q¯) + zq ·H(qˆ)− 3
4n2
)
+
(
(1− zp) ·H(p¯) + zp ·H(pˆ)− 3
4n2
)
+
(
(1− zq) ·
∫ 1−q¯
0
h(y)dy + zq ·
∫ 1−qˆ
0
h(y)dy − 1
4n2
)
+
(
(1− zq) · (1− h(q¯ + 1
n
))(1− p¯) + zq · (1− h(qˆ + 1
n
))(1− pˆ)
=(1− zq) ·
(
H(q¯) +H(p¯) +
∫ 1−q¯
0
h(y)dy + (1− h(q¯ + 1
n
))(1− p¯)− 7
4n2
)
+ zq ·
(
H(qˆ) +H(pˆ) +
∫ 1−qˆ
0
h(y)dy + (1− h(qˆ + 1
n
))(1− pˆ)− 7
4n2
)
≥(1− zq) · Γ + zq · Γ = Γ,
where the last inequality comes from Eqn. (34).
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